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DENIAL OF REGULATORY ASSISTANCE IN
STRANDED COST RECOVERY IN A
DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY
by Elizabeth A. Nowicki*
I. INTRODUCTION
For many decades, electricity producers and distributors ("for-
mer monopolists") have held the coveted positions of state regulated
monopolists. Former monopolists have been the exclusive providers
of electricity to residential consumers, and most commercial con-
surners and have been permitted to run their electricity lines and
erect electricity poles in public rights-of-way. In addition, they have
been afforded returns on their less-than-optimal investments, and
they have been allowed to charge rates that compensate often ineffi-
cient management and cover related costs. This is all in exchange
for allowing state regulators to set the rates they charge-generally
set at profit margins based on very liberal cost projections. Now, due
to technological innovations and changes in the industry structure,
deregulation is occurring, and competition is emerging in the elec-
tricity generation facet of the industry, threatening former monopo-
lists' omnipotent positions.
Faced with more efficient competitors with newer technology,
leaner management, and lower costs, former monopolists realize that
a competitive market will not allow them to continue to recover the
cost of every inefficient layer of management, every uneconomic
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investment, and every obsolete generator. They, therefore, are cur-
rently arguing that these "stranded costs" are costs incurred as part of
a regulatory contract' with state regulators, and that, even in a de-
regulated electricity generation market, they should be afforded
regulatory assistance in recovering their stranded costs from con-
sumers.
While most academics, practitioners, and regulators agree that
consumers will ultimately bear a portion of the stranded cost burden,
one can argue that regulatory assistance in stranded cost recovery via
consumers-who have sustained the monopolists for almost a cen-
tury-can be fully denied. After discussing the background and de-
velopment of the electric industry, the stranded cost recovery prob-
lem, and several solutions, the author concludes that denying
regulatory assistance to former monopolists in the recovery of their
stranded costs can be justified both legally and economically.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY
A. Natural Monopoly Status
The electricity market, which by traditional definition encom-
passes generation, transmission, and distribution, was assumed for
years to be a "natural monopoly." 2 Economists characterized the
market as a natural monopoly based on the fixed costs and econo-
mies of scale of providing electricity.3 The fixed costs encompassed
such things as land, environmental pollution control and monitoring,
generation plants, poles and lines, transmission facilities, and related
technical support facilities.4 If a second market participant were to
enter the market, it could not justify investing in these fixed costs as
1. This is also referred to as "regulatory compact."
2. A "natural monopoly" exists if a single firm can supply the market at a
lower cost than can two or more firms, because, over a large range of output,
the average cost curve height for the relevant product declines with increasing
output. See MARK W. FRANKENA & BRUCE M. OWEN, ELECTRIC UTILITY
MERGERS 5-6 (1994); RICHARD L. GORDON, REFORMING THE REGULATION OF
ELECTRIC UTILITIES 20 (1982); Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulating Telecommu-
nications, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25, 31 (1995).
3. See GORDON, supra note 2, at 20-23.
4. See id. at 22-23.
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such an investment would be redundant. 5 The economies of scale
6
resulted from one market participant: (1) building several units on
one site to maximize the centralization of management and environ-
mental monitoring and to fully supply the available distribution and
transmission capacity; 7 and (2) building a large enough individual
unit to serve the ideal electricity load.8 Establishing multiple firms in
a market which lends itself, according to traditional theories, to
economies of scale was economically inefficient and contraindicated.
In spite of this theory and ample academic analysis of fixed costs and
economies of scale indicating that the market should be treated as a
natural monopoly, turn of the century industrialists and others were
producing their own electricity. As one might have predicted, these
producers eventually experienced shake-out, and this failure bol-
stered the idea that electricity was, and should be regulated as, a
natural monopoly.
B. Historical Regulatory Treatment of the Electricity Industry
Recognizing that the electricity industry was a natural monop-
oly, both the states, vis-h.-vis state Public Service Commissions, and
the federal government, vis-h-vis the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC),9 traditionally have regulated the industry.'0
5. For example, if one utility invested in one set of electricity poles and
lines in a given area, the cost of another firm doing such in the same locale,
thereby having erected two sets of poles and lines, would be inefficient.
6. Economies of scale exist if unit costs decline with the volume of pro-
duction over the relevant range of output. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F.
Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71
N.Y.U. L. REv. 851, 868 (1996). In the electricity industry, the unit costs tra-
ditionally decline with the volume of production because the significant tech-
nology costs, such as those of an electricity plant, do not vary with the amount
of electricity produced. Thus, the more electricity that is produced, the more
units to spread the fixed costs over and the lower the unit cost.
7. The economies of scale in transmission and distribution have been said
to be large enough to, in and of themselves, justify treatment of the electric in-
dustry as a natural monopoly. See Richard J. Pierce Jr., Using the Gas Indus-
try as a Guide to Reconstituting the Electricity Industry, RES. IN L. & ECON.,
1991, at 16-17.
8. See GORDON, supra note 2, at 21-23.
9. Name changes by the FERC over the past twenty years have been dis-
regarded by the author.
10. See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & JAMES E. HICKEY, JR., ENERGY LAW AND
POLICY 159-61 (1989).
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These regulatory agencies have set the rates the utilities charged their
customers, monitored the quality of service provided, ensured the
provision of "universal service,"' and addressed a host of other is-
sues arising in such a crucial industry displaying monopoly charac-
teristics. 2
While regulation has served the function of keeping in check an
industry that could otherwise fall prey to the perils of monopoly
power,' 3 regulation has not achieved all that consumer watchdogs
had hoped. Particularly over recent years, analysts have noted that
the regulated rates of electricity charged to customers significantly
11 Universal service simply means the provision of service to all who so
desire, regardless of their proximity to a generation facility. Universal service
generally requires rate subsidies, which are only feasible in a regulated envi-
ronment. In a truly competitive market, a farmer in rural Wyoming likely
could not have electric service because the cost of running the electric lines to
his farm would exceed any reasonable fee that he could pay. In a regulated
environment, where governmental agencies establish and enforce universal
service plans, regulatory agencies can set electricity rates to allow for subsidies
("cross subsidization") from the customers who can be serviced cheaply, such
as concentrated blocks of customers in urban areas, to the customers who carry
a high cost of service provision, such as the farmer in Wyoming. See
GORDON, supra note 2, at 209.
12. See ToMAiN & HIcKEY, supra note 10, at 161-62.
13. There are three main concerns when dealing with a monopolist: the
charging of "monopoly rents," the reaping of "monopoly profits," and "dead-
weight loss."
A monopolist reaps monopoly rents when it earns profits in excess of
those required to cover costs, including capital costs. These rents create no in-
centive to cut costs and become more efficient, and these rents become a mo-
nopolist's idge fixe, inducing the monopolist to do whatever possible, within
the budget provided by the rents, to preserve its monopoly position.
A monopolist earns profits when it chooses to sell less of its product than
the market demands at a price higher than that which would have been set in a
competitive market. This forces some consumers, who would be willing to
purchase the product at the lower, competitive market price, to forgo purchas-
ing the product at the higher monopolist price.
Loss of economic wealth when willing consumers are denied a purchase
at a competitive market price is termed a "deadweight loss" to consumers.
Regulation avoids these monopoly problems by: (1) setting rates that
deny monopoly rents by keying rates to costs; and (2) setting rates that deny
monopoly profits and prevent deadweight loss by analyzing the demand for the
product and striving to realistically meet the demand through rate subsidies.
See FRANKENA & OWEN, supra note 2, at 3-7.
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exceed current market prices 14 of electricity generated by independ-
ent power producers.' 5 The solution to such a problem seemed to be
competition since market forces would drive electricity prices toward
marginal costs. Regulators, however, feared that the industry was
not ready to be treated as anything other than a regulated natural mo-
nopoly and, therefore, was not ready to be opened to competition.
They feared that the power of a monopolist would regenerate itself if
the electricity industry was free of the thumb of governmental regu-
lation.
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY
A. Evolution of Competitive Trends in the Electricity Industry
The notion that the electricity industry was anything other than a
pure natural monopoly slowly became apparent when competition
appeared spontaneously in bypassing for electricity generation.
16
When wholesale electricity became increasingly expensive in New
York state in the late 1980s, many large factories either began pur-
chasing power from smaller, independent power generators or began
producing their own power. 17 Similarly, municipalities began gener-
ating their own electricity to sell to their residents. 18 Thus, it became
clear that there was room for some sort of competition in the elec-
tricity market. By definition, a natural monopoly exists when a
14. Market price in an efficient market is the price at which the marginal
cost, as a general measure of the value of the resources expended in produc-
tion, equals the value that a consumer places on a product. See GORDON, su-
pra note 2, at 24-25.
For purposes of this paper, when referring to a market as a competitive
market, it will be assumed to be fully competitive, and, as such, market prices
will be assumed to be efficient as above defined.
15. See, e.g., Richard D. Kinder, The Monolith is Cracking: Electric Re-
structuring and Its Implications for Gas, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 15, 1995, at
22.
16. "Bypassing" occurs when a utility customer decides not to purchase all
of the regulated monopoly product that it needs from the traditional regulated
monopoly, but rather finds an outside seller or provides the service themselves.
See James L. Plummer, Bypass Concepts and Transmission Access, in
COMPETITION IN ELECTRICITY: NEW MARKETS AND NEW STRUCTURES 43
(James L. Plummer & Susan Troppmann eds., 1990).
17. See, e.g., Michael Farrell, Glens Falls Looking to Leave NiMo's Grid,
CAP. DIST. Bus. REv., June 19, 1995, at 1.
18. Seeid. at28.
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single firm can supply the market at a lower cost than can two or
more firms. If firms other than the natural monopolist were partially
supplying the electricity generation component of the market at a
lower cost than the natural monopolist, the theory that a true natural
monopoly existed in the electricity industry was wrong. 19 Further,
technological advances in the electricity industry indicated that the
economies of scale were not so great that the industry must be a
natural monopoly.20 Regulators, academics, and economists began
to query, then, whether the electricity generation market was ready to
be deregulated and opened to competition.
B. Current Status of the Industry
Though federal and state regulators began to acknowledge that
there was some competition in the electricity generation facet of the
electricity industry, their legislative partners were not willing to con-
cede that 'the industry was ready for deregulation until the 1990s. It
was then that legislation was introduced at both the state and federal
levels, which contemplated deregulation of electricity generation,
while retaining regulation of transmission and distribution to compel
reasonable access. 2
Currently such deregulation legislation is progressing, and there
is agreement now that there can be full and robust competition in
electricity generation. However, neither the states nor the federal
regulators can yet fathom competition in the transmission and distri-
bution of electricity, because it is simply still more efficient to run
one set of lines and poles. 22 Further, it is important that regulators
monitor the transmission and distribution networks in the nation to
19. See FRANKENA & OWEN, supra note 2, at 5-6. Private monopolists
have recently supplied about 75% of the nation's electric power. See Consum-
ers' Lower Electric Bills Hinge on Congress, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 1997, at
10A.
20. See Sidak & Spulber, supra note 6, at 873-74.
21. See Electric Consumers' Power to Choose Act of 1997, H.R. 655, 105th
Cong. (1997); Consumers Electric Power Act of 1997, H.R. 1230, 105th Cong.
(1997); Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1997, S. 237, 105th Cong.
(1997); New York State Electricity Industry Restructuring Act, S. 1460, 220th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997).
22. The lack of competition in most facets of electricity transmission and
distribution confirms that those aspects of the industry are still natural mo-
nopolies. See Plummer, supra note 16, at 43.
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ensure that one firm does not control the transmission and distribu-
tion in an anticompetitive manner or in a manner which will thwart
reliable electricity provision to everyone who seeks it.23 Thus, while
competition is beginning to march forward in the electricity parade,
initially only generators will be marching.
24
C. Goals in the Electricity Market
It is generally stated in absolute terms that deregulation and
competition in the electricity market will result in lower electricity
costs.25 Moreover, it is hoped that broader additional benefits will be
reaped by deregulating the electricity generation market and opening
the market to competition.
26
The New York state27 legislature, for example, specifies that its
intent in moving toward deregulation is, in part, "to avoid economic
waste and duplication while providing the lowest possible prices for
electricity for consumers, consistent with a determination of what is
fair, just and reasonable for electric utilities."
28
23. See H.R. 655; H.R. 1230; S. 237; N.Y. S. 1460.
24. While the argument can be made that transmission and distribution are,
in fact, ready to be deregulated, for purposes of this paper, the author will as-
sume that only generation is at a stage where it can be deregulated. See N.Y.
S. 1460, §2.
25. See Consumers' Lower Electric Bills Hinge on Congress, supra note
19, at 1OA (estimating potential savings on the average customer's bill of 10%
to 26% per year after deregulation); Peter Coy, The New Marketplace in Utili-
ties May Bedevil Small Business, BUS. WK., Mar. 3, 1997, available in 1997
WL 8268765 (in a fully competitive market, "electricity rates for small busi-
ness could fall as much as 20% in states with low-cost power now, and up to
60% in states with high-cost power"); Kinder, supra note 15, at 22.
The highest rate in the nation for 1992-1993 was that of Long Island
Lighting Co., a New York electric company, at 16.2 cents/kwh. See 25 Most
Expensive Electrics, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 15, 1994, at 54.
The lowest rate in the nation for 1992-1993 was 4.3 cents/kwh charged
by both Washington Water Power Co. and Pacific Power & Light Co. See 25
Least Expensive Electrics, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 1, 1994, at 54.
26. See Charles G. Stalon, Oversight Hearing on Cogeneration and the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), in COMPETITION IN
ELECTRICITY: NEW MARKETS AND NEW STRUCTURES, supra note 16, at 319
337.
27. Throughout this paper, New York will be the point-of-reference state,
as it is one of the more progressive states in the move toward deregulation of
traditionally regulated utilities.
28. N.Y. S. 1460, §2.
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The House of Representatives of the 105th Congress hopes that
"[tihe development of vibrant competition in the retail market for
electric energy will: (A) reduce the costs of electric energy to even
the smallest consumers of electricity; (B) create jobs as American
businesses are able to lower costs and better compete in world mar-
kets and against foreign competition here at home; and (C) result in a
more efficient utility industry.,
29
The United States Senate notes that "[i]t is in the public interest
that consumers receive reliable and inexpensive electric service and
competition among electric suppliers can produce these benefits."
30
Given the agreement that a competitive electricity market will
rectify some of the existing economic problems in the current mar-
ket, a competitive market, at least in electricity generation, is un-
avoidable.
IV. STRANDED COST RECOVERY "PROBLEM" IN A DEREGULATED
INDUSTRY
A. Factual Scenario
Former monopolists are currently faced with new electricity
generation competitors who are using modem, more efficient tech-
nology, who have leaner management structures, who have cheaper
environmental compliance systems, and who have not made poor in-
vestments. At the same time, former monopolists are burdened with
outdated technology, disadvantageous contracts, 3 1 and inefficient
29. Electric Consumers' Power to Choose Act of 1997, H.R. 655, 105th
Cong., §2(a)(5) (1997).
30. Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1997, S. 237, 105th Cong., § 2(b),
(1997).
31. In the 1970's and 1980's, when the energy crisis made uncertain the
stability of traditional oil, gas, and electricity energy sources, many state Pub-
lic Service Commissions encouraged the formation of independent power pro-
ducers ("IPPs"), to establish stand-alone power plants. These plants solely
generated power for sale to former monopolists, to ensure that electricity
would be available to meet any upswing in demand due to problems with other
energy sources. The Public Service Commissions required that, to continue to
be afforded protected monopoly treatment, former monopolists (e.g., Niagara
Mohawk, in New York state) must contract with the IPPs to purchase some of
their electricity to make it feasible for the IPPs to continue in business even in
times of non-energy crisis. Some would argue that the Public Service Com-
missions contracted with the former monopolists such that if former monopo-
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management. Former monopolists have realized that their costs are
significantly higher than that of their new competitors, but they have
chosen not to write off outdated investments and force their share-
holders to assume realization of the risks inherent in a deregulating
industry. They have also decided to forgo a frantic search for ways
to cut costs and slim down management. Instead, former monopo-
lists have begun clamoring for state and federal regulatory agencies
to force electricity consumers to bear the brunt of these costs. For-
mer monopolists refer to these costs as "stranded costs" and argue
that these costs were incurred as part of a regulatory contract with the
regulators. They ignore the fact that they voluntarily incurred the
costs in order to receive favored regulated treatment, and they there-
fore maintain that they have a compelling case for imposing the re-
covery of such costs on electricity consumers.
B. Stranded Costs Defined
Stranded costs merit specific definition. They have been defined
by the New York State Public Service Commission as "the difference
between the net embedded cost of utility plant and the plant's market
value," but they "can also encompass factors such as transaction
costs associated with reducing a company's work force, carrying
charges on excess capacity or revenue losses due to customer migra-
tion to competitive alternatives." 32 Stranded costs have been defined
lists purchased power from the IPPs through long-term contracts, the Public
Service Commissions would allow former monopolists to recover the cost of
such IPP electricity for as long as former monopolists were under contract with
the IPPs. See Sidak & Spulber, supra note 6, at 879-81. In Part VIII.A. of this
paper, it is shown that no such "contracts" were entered into. Rather, former
monopolists chose to do what the Public Service Commissions so required, to
avoid losing the benefits that the Public Service Commissions were affording
them.
Unfortunately, former monopolists contracted with the IPPs to purchase
electricity at prices that were high due to the energy crisis and the inflation at
that time. Thus, in the early 1990's, it became clear that the contract prices
former monopolists were paying the IPPs for electricity were well above the
prices at which former monopolists could self-generate the electricity. These
contracts, then, are uneconomic, and they fall within the definitions of stranded
costs, provided in Part IV.B., infra.
32. Public Service Commission's Memorandum of Law, In re Energy
Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 653 N.Y.S. 2d 502 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (Index
No. 5830/96).
January 1999]
440 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:431
by the New York judiciary as "[r]evenue shortfalls occasioned for
diverse reasons."33 Practitioners have defined stranded costs as "the
immediate differential between a utility's fully allocated rate and the
market price."34 The author primarily views stranded costs as costs
associated with independent power producer contracts, archaic and
inefficient production facilities, 35 and imprudent facilities invest-
ments.36 These costs create a difference between a utility's fully allo-
cated rate and the market price because the market price, stabilizing
at marginal cost, does not reflect the costs of outdated facilities, im-
prudent investments and inefficient technologies. 37 To the extent
that such costs create a difference between the net embedded cost of
a utility's plant and the plant's market value, account for the imme-
diate differential between a utility's fully allocated rate and the mar-
ket price, and create revenue shortfalls, the author's categorization of
stranded costs coexists with the other abovementioned definitions of
stranded costs.
38
Regardless of the nuances in such definitions of stranded costs,
the problems created by stranded costs are the same: they are costs
incurred by the utilities for which pure market pricing or pricing in
accordance with marginal costs will not allow recovery.39 Phrased
differently, in a fully competitive market where the price of electric-
ity will eventually fall to marginal cost, stranded costs, which by
definition are not included in marginal cost, cannot be recovered
through the market pricing of electricity.40
33. Id. at 928 n.3.
34. See Stephen L. Teichler, Generation, Deregulation, and Market Power:
Will Antitrust Laws Fill the Void?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 15, 1996, at 34.
35. See Coy, supra note 25.
36. See Consumers' Lower Electric Bills Hinge on Congress, supra note
19, at 10A.
37. See Alfred E. Kahn, Can Regulation and Competition Coexist? Solu-
tions to the Stranded Cost Problem and Other Conundra, ELECTRICITY.J., Oct.
1994, at 26.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
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In short, stranded costs are costs outside of efficient marginal
costs, and everyone agrees they are bad4 -they are not an economi-
cally positive phenomena. 42 Academic definitions aside, they might
best be defined as the "'Tonya Harding' of our industry."
43
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO STRANDED COST PROBLEM IN A
DEREGULATED INDUSTRY
Market prices in a competitive electricity generation market will
not allow for recovery of stranded costs. Therefore, former mo-
nopolists who have stranded costs to recover cannot automatically do
so.44 This is troubling to them. What, then, are the possible ways to
deal with the "stranded cost problem?" There are a plethora of pro-
posals on the table from various legislators, consumer advocacy
groups, utility organizations, economic think tanks, academics,
regulators, and others.45 Full, partial, or total denial of recovery of
stranded costs through regulatory assistance are the most noteworthy
of the proposals.
A. Full Recovery of Stranded Costs Through Regulatory Assistance
Full recovery of stranded costs could be achieved with the help
of state regulators. The regulators could impose surcharges, or "ac-
cess fees," on the independent generators who desire access to for-
mer monopolists' transmission and distribution systems.46 Such fees
41. See, e.g., Alexander Cockburn, Utilities' $500-Billion Power Play, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 1997, at B9 ("The word 'stranded' is used in the sense of
'beached,' as in a beached whale ....").
42. See, e.g., FERC Commissioners, Sharp, Downplay Ramifications of
Court's Energy Ruling, ENERGY REP., July 18, 1994, available in 1994 WL
2490462 ("[S]tranded investments are 'uneconomic assets' that occur in all
businesses.").
43. NARUC Eyes Stranded Investment Jurisdictional Issues, ENERGY REP.,
Mar. 7, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2490964 (quoting Dave Penn, American
Public Power Association's policy analysis director).
44. See generally Stranded Costs Seen at $200-Billion, with Utilities Bear-
ing Most of Burden, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Nov. 28, 1994, at 8 (estimating
stranded costs at about $200 billion).
45. See Lester Baxter et al., Mitigating Transition Costs: The Utility's Role,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 15, 1997, at 30 (discussing proposals for addressing
stranded costs).
46. See Peter Passell, A Makeover for Electric Utilities: Power Industry,
Facing Competition, Struggles With Change, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1995, at D6.
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could serve, in part, to pay for the recovery of former monopolists'
stranded costs.47 Regulators could also allow former monopolists to
charge "customer exit fees" if customers chose to have their electric-
ity supplied to them by other independent generators rather than by
the local former monopolists.
48
B. Partial Recovery of Stranded Costs Through Regulatory
Assistance and Partial Denial ofAssisted Stranded Cost Recovery
A partial recovery of stranded costs could be achieved by recov-
ering some stranded costs attributable to electricity generation
through a combination of transmission access fees and exit fees
while still forcing the former monopolists to deal with some stranded
costs themselves.49 This would be the result if the consumer advo-
cates and the utilities compromised on each of their positions.50 In
the end, neither side will have gotten its dream solution but will have
instead struck a "grand bargain. ' '5 1
C. Cold Turkey: Total Denial of Regulatory Assistance
Former monopolists could be left entirely on their own to deal
with stranded costs-they could be forced to go "cold turkey." They
could: (1) write off their archaic investments, ancient facilities, and
poor investments; 52 (2) be purchased by a company that needs the
ability to write off assets to decrease profits and book values; (3) de-
fer writing off the stranded costs until they need a tax deduction; or
47. See id.
48. See Coy, supra note 25.
49. See Maine Stranded Investment Rule Seen as Gypping Utilities, Slam-
ming Munis, N.E. POWER REP., Mar. 17, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2366423
(discussing Maine's 50% state assisted recovery rule with regard to stranded
costs).
50. See Ray Pospisil, The California Aftershock, ELECTRICAL WORLD,
Sept. 1994, at 29 (quoting John Anderson, executive director of the Electricity
Consumers Resource Council: "You have to compromise on stranded costs").
51. Passell, supra note 46, at DI (quoting Peter Bradford, the recently re-
tired chairman of the New York Public Service Commission).
52. See FERC Commissioners, Sharp, Downplay Ramifications of Court's
Energy Ruling, supra note 42.
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(4) buy out their disadvantageous IPP contracts or negotiate for bet-
ter terms.53 In reality, they could choose from several options to
unilaterally deal with stranded costs, requiring them to assume full
responsibility for their costs.
VI. WHICH STRANDED COST SOLUTION LOOKS BETTER TO WHOM
A. Former Monopolists
Clearly former monopolists would like to fully recover stranded
costs by charging access fees, imputing costs to state regulated
transmission rates, and charging customer exit fees.54 Such recovery
will ensure that they will not have to take a loss on stranded costs,
which will in turn allow them to protect their investors while still at-
tracting new investors and capital.
B. Electricity Consumers
From an electricity consumer's perspective, former monopolists'
recovery of no stranded costs is ideal. This theoretically ensures that
consumers will not have to further support an industry which they
have funded for years. Consumers will be able to reap the benefits of
deregulation and competition quickly, and they will not have to be
tied to a rate structure that does not reflect the market conditions.
5 5
That some traditionally powerful utilities will potentially go bankrupt
by not being allowed to recover stranded costs is not a fatal impedi-
ment to the benefits that the consumers will reap from the non-
recovery of stranded costs. The dynamics of the electricity genera-
tion market are such that new market entrants can efficiently and re-
liably supply cheaper power in place of that supplied by former
53. See American Gas Ass'n v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1496, 1505 (D.C. Cir.
1990); NIMO Offers to Buy Out 44 Contracts with Independent Power Pro-
ducers, N.E. POWER REP., Aug. 16, 1996, at 1; see also Erik Kriss, Environ-
mental Groups Fight State Aid for NiMo, POST STANDARD, Dec. 13, 1996, at
C5 (discussing proposed legislation which will provide state guarantees to aid
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation improve its credit rating in order to bor-
row money to buy out the IPP contracts).
54. See Cockbum, supra note 41, at B9 ("The utilities' dream is to unload
the $500 billion in debts on these plants and other mature facilities onto rate-
payers and taxpayers instead of onto their shareholders.").
55. See id.
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monopolists' generators. 56 Also, the Public Service Commissions
will continue to operate--ensuring that some mechanism for main-
taining reliable service will exist.
57
C. Business Owners
From the perspective of business owners who compete with out-
of-state businesses, it is essential that utilities do not recover stranded
costs from the customer.58  When stranded costs are recovered
through rates charged to the customer, the business owner who is an
electricity customer in such a jurisdiction will be at a huge cost dis-
advantage compared to the business owner who is an electricity cus-
tomer in a jurisdiction where stranded costs are not recovered
through rates charged to the customer.59 For the business owner in a
jurisdiction where stranded costs are recovered through customer
rates, his costs are per se higher than those of a comparable business
owner in another jurisdiction, and he will ultimately have no option
other than to leave the jurisdiction if he wants to retain the ability to
price his wares at competitive levels.
6 0
D. Employees
From an employee's perspective, denial of stranded cost recov-
ery is critical lest the employer migrate to a state where stranded
utility costs are not recovered through rates to the consumer. Fur-
ther, an employer will likely try to cut costs to survive by laying off
staff before moving to a non-stranded cost recovery jurisdiction.
61
56. See Electricity Consumers Resource Council ("ELCON"), Policy
Changes Affecting Non-Utility Generators, in COMPETITION IN ELECTRICITY:
NEW MARKETS AND NEW STRUCTURES, supra note 16, at 61, 66.
57. See Kahn, supra note 37, at 23.
58. See Affidavit of Warren E. Myers at 4, In re Energy Ass'n v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 653 N.Y.S. 2d 502 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (Index No. 5830/960).
59. See New York State Electricity Industry Restructuring Act, S. 1460,
220th Sess., § 2 (N.Y. 1997).
60. See id.
61. The irony is that laying off staff will never usefully lower the em-
ployer's costs to the extent that the employer is able to price competitively
against another producer in a jurisdiction where stranded utility costs are not
recovered through the customers. To the extent that stranded costs are recov-
ered through electricity prices to one producer, and to the extent that two pro-
ducers use the same optimally efficient amount of electricity in the production
of their wares, the costs for the producer who purchases electricity in a
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Thus, both in the short and long terms, it is important to an em-
ployee, qua employee, that stranded costs are not recovered via cus-
tomer rates.
VII. FORCING FORMER MONOPOLIST TO Go COLD TURKEY IS AN
ECONOMICALLY JUSTIFIABLE OPTION
It is economically justifiable to force former monopolists to ad-
dress their stranded costs themselves, without any sort of regulatory
intervention. While this choice is defensible because it mimics the
truly competitive market by rewarding efficiency, inducing cost re-
ductions, and encouraging careful planning, it is also better in many
respects than other options.
A. Other Options Have Competitive and Economic Weaknesses
From a basic economic standpoint, forcing recovery of costs
through transmission and distribution rates higher than those at
which the market would otherwise stabilize is inefficient. If part of
the goal of deregulation is to allow natural competition to lower
prices to reflect efficient marginal costs, then forcing consumers to
pay stranded costs---costs above competitive marginal costs-is
completely contrary to the goal of the deregulation movement.
Further, allowing recovery of stranded costs attributable to elec-
tricity generation through access fees charged for transmission and
distribution is undesirable because it skews costs.62 To allow recov-
ery of costs attributable to one market via rates in another market is
just economically bizarre.
Similarly, allowing stranded cost recovery through exit fees will
"thwart the very efficiency gains that will prevent stranded invest-
ment tomorrow."63  To the extent that non-recovery penalizes
stranded cost recovery jurisdiction will never be able to equal or be lower than
the costs of the other producer in a non-recovery jurisdiction. Therefore, the
producer who purchases and uses electricity in a jurisdiction where stranded
costs are recovered through rates to the consumer will never, regardless of how
much of the staff is laid off to lower costs, be able to price goods at the prices
of the latter producer.
62. See Mary O'Driscoll, FERC Learned Wrong Lesson From Gas De-
regulation-Enron, ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 12, 1994, at 1, 4 ("[W]holesale
transmission service customers should not have to underwrite 'damages' at-
tributable to retail generation customers.").
63. The 1997 Electric Executives' Forum, Which Parts of Your Business
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inefficient investments in a competitive market, allowing recovery of
inefficient investments will encourage those poor investments in the
future.
Finally, regulatory-assisted stranded cost recovery leads to eco-
nomic inefficiencies-including inefficient consumer choices.6 4 For
example, assume that the true market price of electricity is six cents
per kilowatt, but the retail price is raised to eleven cents per kilowatt
when stranded costs are allowed to be recovered. A residential cus-
tomer who is considering buying a dishwasher will consider the cost
of electricity needed to run the dishwasher. While she would pur-
chase the dishwasher if the cost of running it were only six cents per
kilowatt, she will not purchase the dishwasher because the cost of
running it is eleven cents per kilowatt. Stated differently, she will
not purchase the dishwasher even though she would have been will-
ing to purchase both the dishwasher and the electricity needed to run
it had the price of electricity been at its marginal cost, what it costs to
produce. Though willing to make an economically efficient pur-
chase-purchasing the dishwasher because she can afford to buy it
and run it had electricity costs been set at marginal cost-she was
forced to instead make an economically inefficient purchasing deci-
sion which resulted in a net loss to the economy.
B. Forcing Former Monopolists to Go Cold Turkey is Economically
Reasonable
Forcing former monopolists to assume total responsibility for
their costs is an economically reasonable method for addressing
stranded cost recovery. Such denial of regulatory assistance mimics
the treatment that a competitive environment would afford. It also
reduces rewards for wasteful investments, embodies notions of fair-
ness in risk assumption, and is not, per se, fatal to the continued eco-
nomic feasibility of former monopolists.
Will Likely See the Greatest Push for Development in the Next 3 to 5 Years,
and Why?, PUB. UTIL. FoRT., June 1, 1994, at 18 [herinafter Electric Execu-
tives Forum] (quoting Jeffery K. Skilling).
64. See generally id. (discussing how various utility company executives
plan to be more efficient for their customers).
446
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1. Denial of regulatory assistance mimics the treatment a
competitive environment would afford to stranded costs
Forcing former monopolists to address their stranded costs
themselves mimics the way a truly competitive environment would
deal with the costs of poor investments and outdated technology.
Any economist would say that "[i]n a truly competitive environment
... uneconomic assets are written off."' 65 While there are other ways
for former monopolists to deal with stranded costs,66 a truly com-
petitive environment would not support regulatory assistance in
stranded cost recovery. If electricity had not been a regulated mo-
nopoly for almost a century, it is not unlikely that former monopo-
lists would even ask for regulatory assistance to recover stranded
costs now. A competitive environment simply does not handle costs
in such a manner.
67
When faced with the denial of fully assisted recovery of
stranded costs, former monopolists will begin searching for socially
productive and economically rational ways to remain competitive.
They will cut costs both by reducing expenses to the lowest possible
level and by releasing unnecessary management. 68 In addition, they
will focus carefully on customer service to encourage customers to
remain with them while they fight to lower costs, 69 and they will be-
gin competing on valid issues for which the consumers are the ulti-
mate beneficiaries.
65. FERC Commissioners, Sharp, Downplay Ramifications of Court's En-
ergy Ruling, supra note 42.
66. See infra Part VII.B.4.
67. See Eric Niiler, Pilgrim Powering Up as Competition Looms, PATRIOT
LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), Apr. 19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8174169
(quoting power industry consultant Bruce Biewald "'There's no longer a way
to shield an uneconomic asset .... Competition will make some of these deci-
sions more rational."').
68. See Baxter et al., supra note 45, at 32.
69. See Electric Executives' Forum, supra note 63, at 44-48; see also Hue
Ha, Meter-Reading Companies Seek Ways to Cash in on Fast-Growing Busi-
ness, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1997, available in 1997 WL-WSJ 2413510 (de-
scribing meter-reading devices as a means for reducing costs and improving
customer service).
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2. Denial of regulatory assistance reduces rewards for wasteful
investments
In a traditional regulatory environment, a natural monopolist
would have little reason to plan every small facet of an investment to
ensure that the investment is truly the best one, because regulatory
agencies historically have been very liberal in allowing returns on
even less than excellent investments.70  Allowing recovery of
stranded costs which, in part, encompass poorly made investments
would continue to reward wasteful investments in a manner which
would not encourage careful planning and forecasting. 71 However,
in a competitve market, participants will be rewarded for basing in-
vestment decisions on careful planning and forecasts.
72
3. Denial of regulatory assistance embodies notions of fairness and
risk bearing
There are essentially two parties on whom the burden of
stranded costs can fall: the electricity consumers or the electricity
investors. 73 Apportioning the stranded cost burden to the electricity
investors-as will ultimately occur if former monopolists address
stranded costs without regulatory intervention-is the "fairest" thing
to do, since the electricity investors were the parties who assumed
the risk of non-recovery in return for the potential gains on their in-
vestment.
74
Presumably, an investor invests in a company after analyzing the
investment and concluding that the potential gains from investing in
the company outweigh the potential losses, and after weighing the
respective likelihoods that the investment will produce gains or
70. See Pierce, supra note 7, at 12.
71. See id. at 12; see also FRANKENA & OWEN, supra note 2, at 6 (describ-
ing how monopolies do not have an incentive to be as efficient as possible be-
cause of the absence of the threat of competition).
72. See FRANKENA & OWEN, supra note 2, at 6; Gordon, supra note 2, at
25.
73. See Mary B. Bushnell, Blinded By the Light: Restructuring Public
Utilities for the Promise of a Competitive Energy Future, in COMPETITION IN
ELECTRICITY: NEW MARKETS AND NEW STRUCTURES, supra note 16, at 585,
589-91.
74. See Peter Coy & Gary McWilliams, Electricity: The Power Shift Ahead,
BUS. WK., Dec. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10771765 ("'A bond is not a
risk-free investment."').
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losses. The risk that the investment will be a bad one is entirely on
the investor. Even if it is virtually certain that the investment will in-
crease in value, should the investment fail to do so, the investor must
bear the loss. Therefore it is intuitive that the electricity investors
should ultimately be the backstop for the non-recovery of stranded
costs.
Former monopolists would argue that their investors did not as-
sume the risk of non-recovery of stranded costs because it has always
been unfathomable that the electricity companies would not be able
to fully recoup their investments. This argument for shifting the bur-
den of the stranded cost recovery to the consumers is unpersuasive
because (1) the investors had full knowledge of the contingency of
non-recovery of stranded costs, and (2) the market price of their in-
vestment theoretically accounted for the uncertainty of stranded cost
recovery.
Investors have had full knowledge of the contingency of non-
recovery of stranded costs-the electric companies have warned
them. For example, Long Island Lighting Company, a New York
electric utility, told its investors in its 1988 Annual Report to Share-
holders that the recovery treatment to be afforded to its Shoreham
nuclear plant-which likely would never go into operation 7 -was
uncertain, and it might never be afforded any recovery at all.
76
Similarly, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation indicated that it
faces significant challenges77 with economic uncertainties relating to
competition, recovery of investments, uncertain contracts, and other
stranded costs, and filing for bankruptcy cannot be ruled out.78 Fur-
ther, numerous investment rating services such as Moody's and
Standard and Poor's have publicized the uncertainty regarding
75. One can safely assume that it was a "bad investment" for purposes of
characterizing it as a stranded asset and stranded cost. See supra Part IV.B.
76. See LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO., 1988 ANNUAL REPORT TO
SHAREHOLDERS (1988).
77. See NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP., FORM 10-K, 1, 6-7 (Dec. 31,
1995) (visited Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www.sec.gov.Archives/edgar/data/71932/
10000071932-96-00000009.txt> [hereinafter NIAGARA, FORM 10-K] (pagina-
tion off of Intemet version; actual pagination may differ).
78. See NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP., FORM 10-Q, (June 31, 1996)
(visited Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/71932/
0000071932-96-000015.txt>; NIAGARA, FORM 10-K, supra note 77.
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stranded cost recovery and the related electric company's financial
instability.
79
Recently former New York State Public Service Commission
Chairman Peter Bradford concluded regulators should not bail out
investors:
Electric utility investors have clearly known for many years
of the possibility of substantial losses, including bank-
ruptcy. That these risks may have been greater than they
perceived or have come from a different direction scarcely
compels the imposition by regulators of an unconditioned
strandable investment tax to assure full recovery.
80
More telling is Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation's own
summation of the investment, uneconomic contract, competition, and
technological uncertainties inherent in its shareholders' investments
in its company:
While the Company will seek full recovery if its investment
through the rate setting process with respect to the issues
described herein, a review of political and regulatory ac-
tions during the past 15 years with respect to industry issues
and the experiences of virtually every other industry that
has gone through deregulation, indicate that utility share-
holders may ultimately bear a significant portion of the
burden of solving these problems. 
81
Thus, it is absurd for former monopolists, when clamoring for
full stranded cost recovery for their investors, to attempt to refute the
presumption that investors were aware of the stranded cost concerns,
79. See Curtis Moulton, Concerns Over Investor-Owned Electric Utilities
Outlined, STANDARD & POOR'S CREDITWEEK, Nov. 22, 1993, at 43; Curtis
Moulton, S&P to Review Electric Utility Benchmarks, STANDARD & POOR'S
CREDITWEEK, Oct. 11, 1993, at 3; MOODY'S INVESTOR SERV., NORTHEAST
BREAK EVEN ANALYSIS: MAGNITUDE OF STRANDED INVESTMENT IN REGION
HIGHLIGHTS CREDIT CONCERNS, 1 (Dec. 1995).
80. See Affidavit of John D. Stewart at 5, In re Energy Ass'n v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 653 N.Y.S. 2d 502 (NY. Sup. Ct. 1996) (Index No. 5830/96) (quot-
ing Statement on Behalf of the Vermont Department of Public Service, July
14, 1996).
81. NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP., FORM 8-K, at 13 (Feb. 15, 1995)
(visited Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/71932/
0000071932-95-000008.txt> ("Management's Discussion and Analysis of Fi-
nancial Condition and Results of Operations") (emphasis added) (pagination
off of Internet version; actual pagination may differ).
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and it is impossible for former monopolists to persuasively argue that
an efficient investment market did not take into account the financial
uncertainties surrounding the electricity industry when pricing the
related investments.82 Investors were aware 83 of the nature of their
investments, and the market price for the electricity investments pre-
sumably reflected the uncertainties inherent in such investments.
84
4. Denial of regulatory assistance is not, per se, fatal to former
monopolists
While former monopolists plead that forcing them to handle
their stranded costs alone will lead them into bankruptcy, 85 they fail
to mention that there are other ways that they can address the
stranded cost recovery issue or at least mitigate the effects of such
costs to avoid bankruptcy.
Former monopolists can look for strategic mergers, from which
to adopt cutting-edge technologies, to capture economies of scale, to
streamline management for more facilities, and to find other cost-
cutting competitive opportunities. 86 To raise capital they can issue
new bonds or sell assets, which would relieve their books of unre-
coverable costs. 87 They can negotiate down or buy out their uneco-
nomic IPP contracts.8 8 They can propose plans for restructuring and
make bond offerings in conjunction with such plans. Finally, they
can utilize the capital markets and the economic options available
82. See Peter D. Blair, Alternative Scenarios for Increasing Competition in
the Electric Power Industry, in COMPETITION IN ELECTRICITY: NEW MARKETS
AND NEW STRUCTURES, supra note 16, at 461, 462-63.
83. Whether or not each and every investor knew is irrelevant. What is
relevant is that the information was freely available to investors, such that each
investor essentially had "constructive knowledge."
84. See Dave Alrozo, Moody's Says High-Cost Producers Face the Abyss
in New Environment, NUCLEONICS WK., Nov. 10, 1994, at 3, available in
LEXIS, News Library Arcnws File.
85. See Joseph F. Schuler, Jr. & Lori A. Burkhart, Moody's: NiMO Bank-
ruptcy Possible, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 1, 1996, at 13.
86. See M&A Strategy Gets Executive Attention, ELECTRICITY DAILY, Mar.
5, 1996, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library Arcnews File.
87. See id.
88. See NIMO Offers To Buy Out 44 Contracts With Independent Power
Producers, supra note 53, at 1; see also Kriss, supra note 53, at C5 (discussing
proposed legislation which will provide state guarantees to aid Niagara Mo-
hawk in improving its credit rating in order to borrow money to buy out the
IPP contracts).
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therein to devise a plan which will ensure their own financial suc-
cess.
VIII. FORCING FORMER MONOPOLISTS TO Go COLD TURKEY IS A
LEGALLY JUSTIFIABLE METHOD BY WHICH TO ADDRESS
STRANDED COSTS
It is legal to refuse to force state ratepayers to pay a power gen-
erator's stranded costs. No "regulatory compact" exists between
former monopolists and the state Public Service Commissions which
would create an obligation for state regulators to assist power gen-
erators in recovering one hundred percent of their stranded costs.
The disallowance of recovery through rates does not violate the re-
cently established "unmistakability doctrine" or Winstar doctrine.
89
Further, though disallowance of recovery through the state ratepayers
might possibly result in the electricity generator having to write-off
their stranded costs as a loss, thus decreasing the value of their
shareholders' investment, it is not an unconstitutional taking of prop-
erty by the state regulators.90
A. The "Regulatory Compact Theory" is a Fiction
Some would argue that, years ago, former monopolists entered
into a "regulatory compact" with the state regulators similar to that in
Winstar9' wherein the state regulators agreed to let the monopolists
recover all of their investments and costs in return for supplying reli-
able service to the state electricity customers and complying with the
requests of the state regulators. 92 From former monopolists' view, it
is an outstanding theory because it raises contract issues which
would ultimately lead to the state regulators having to assist former
monopolists-in recovering all of their stranded costs. Realistically, it
is a theory that is objectively untrue and rather unbelievable in the
deregulated electricity context.
89. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 871-80 (1996) (ar-
ticulating the extent to which the "unmistakability doctrine" allows the gov-
ermment to change regulatory structures unless it has promised a contracting
party, in unmistakable terms, that it would not).
90. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 314-15 (1989); see
also Sidak & Spulber, supra note 6, at 995 (listing the four conditions that are
both necessary and sufficient for a regulatory taking).
91. 518 U.S. 839.
92. See Sidak & Spulber, supra note 6, at 898-99, 907.
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In Winstar, profitable savings and loans thrifts such as Winstar
Corporation agreed to merge failing savings and loans-to free the
government and taxpayers from the burden of those savings and
loans-if federal regulators allowed Winstar and other acquirors to
treat the goodwill of the failing savings and loan in a favorable man-
ner.93 When the government later tried to statutorily deny the acqui-
rors their favorable goodwill treatment, Winstar sued the government
for breach of contract and unconstitutional taking.94 The lower court
found explicit agreements between the acquiring thrifts and their
regulators, 95 and the Supreme Court, on review, did not disturb those
conclusions. 96 The Supreme Court then held that later executive or
legislative action which interfered with the agreements caused a
breach of the explicit contracts, for which the regulators were li-
able.
97
Thus, the Winstar case did not focus on government regulation
of a regulated entity; rather it focused on an entity in an otherwise
regulated industry being permitted to do something outside the scope
of regulation, as part of an agreement with the government. In ex-
change, Winstar and similar corporations relieved the government of
its burden of failing savings and loans. The key factor in Winstar
that compelled the Court to afford Winstar the promised favorable
goodwill treatment was the true contract governing the parties' ac-
tions and obligations.98 Winstar was not doing anything that it was
already obligated by regulation to do.
In the electricity industry, there is no similar regulatory com-
pact. Former monopolists chose to provide reliable service and
comply with the requests of the state and federal regulators in return
for authorization from the states to use public rights-of-way for elec-
tricity poles and electric wire. 99 Accepting consumer rates set by the
93. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 849-51.
94. See id. at 858.
95. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531, 1540 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
96. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 864-67 (1996).
97. See id. at 868-70.
98. See id.
99. See Sidak & Spulber, supra note 6, at 898. Recently the judiciary in
New York State directly rejected the regulatory compact fiction in the electric-
ity industry on the same basis, saying:
Since the turn of the century, electric utilities have been on notice that
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states saved the utilities the costs of negotiating and contracting with
each individual consumer. 00 There was never a compact or contract
as there was in Winstar.10l Rather, there was only the desire by for-
mer monopolists to reap the benefits of legal monopolist status by
doing that which the regulators demanded.
1 2
B. Denying Regulatory Assistance in Recovering Stranded Costs
in a Deregulated Electricity Industry Would Not Result in an
"Unconstitutional Taking"
Denying regulatory assistance to former monopolists in their
pursuit of stranded cost recovery would not result in an unconstitu-
tional taking by the government vis-A-vis the regulators. Such denial
is well within the established parameters for constitutional ratemak-
ing, and such denial remains within the boundaries established by
case law in this area.
1. Parameters for state ratemaking can be met
Ratemaking by an agency is traditionally afforded very broad
protection because it inherently involves the exercise of implied leg-
islative discretion. 0 3 "How such compensation may be ascertained,
and what are the necessary elements in such an inquiry, will always
be an embarrassing question."' 0 4 The courts cannot become involved
they are required to serve the public need for electricity, not in return
for a particular ratemaking method, but in return for a variety of pow-
ers traditionally reserved to the sovereign, including eminent domain
and the use of public rights-of-way.
In re Energy Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 653 N.Y.2d 502, 514 (1996).
100. See Sidak & Spulber, supra note 6, at 898-99 (quoting George L. Priest,
The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of Regulations" Debate,
36 J.L. & ECON. 289, 303 (1993)).
101. See generally Winstar, 518 U.S. at 843 (recognizing contracts between
the government and participants in a regulated industry).
102. See New York State Public Service Commission's Memorandum of
Law at 30; In re Energy Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 653 N.Y.S.2d 502
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (Index No. 5830/96).
103. See Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287,
304 (1933); In re Abrams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 67 N.Y.2d 205, 212
(1986).
104. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308 (1989) (quoting
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898)).
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"so long as constitutional limitations are not transgressed."' 105 For
purposes of the constitutional inquiry, only the impact of the rate
matters. 10 6 It is the end result, not the theory or rate process under-
lying the resultant rate that cannot be unreasonable lest it be confis-
catory and, hence, unconstitutional.
10 7
a. a fair rate of return is provided
In assessing whether a rate is confiscatory, one can consider the
fair rate of return to be afforded the shareholders, given the risks.
10 8
Since FERC's 1996 order opening the electricity generation market
to competition, generators have been on notice that they might not be
able to recover stranded costs with competitive market rates.10 9 As a
result, former monopolists have been signaling to their shareholders
that they might have to grapple with non-recovery of stranded
costs."10 Investors, therefore, were and are aware of the risks in the
deregulated electricity industry,"' and they assumed the risk of
non-recovery of stranded costs in their investment.
b. investor and consumer interests are balanced
Nonconfiscatory "just and reasonable rates" should reflect a
"balancing of the investor and the consumer interests." 112 To that
105. LosAngeles Gas, 289 U.S. at 304.
106. See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 310.
107. See id. at 307-10; Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591, 602 (1944) ("If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be
unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry... is at an end.").
108. See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 310; Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603; In
re St. Lawrence Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 42 N.Y.2d 461 (1977).
109. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access
Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities: Recovery of
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540
(1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385).
110. See James Denn, NiMo Seeks Regulatory Relief as Financial Condition
Worsens, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Aug. 31, 1995, at C17, available in
1995 WL 14532083; see also supra Part VII.B.3.
111. See Syracuse Bus., Apr. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8863928 (Niag-
ara Mohawk Vice President of Marketing and Economic Development dis-
cusses new risks and changes which shareholders and investors are going to
face after deregulation).
112. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603.
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point, it is important to look again at the investors' risks." 3 As dis-
cussed above, investors in electric utilities have been aware for some
time that stranded cost recovery is problematic. They were aware
that the trend toward deregulation might impact the financial stability
of the utilities. Thus, they could factor these issues into their deci-
sion whether to invest in an electric utility, and they could decide
whether or not to assume the risks inherent in such an investment.
There is no corresponding argument in favor of imposing upon
the consumer the stranded cost risk and resultant burden. Rather, it
can be argued that the consumer has helped the electricity generators
recover their fixed and marginal costs over the past decades, and the
consumer, in that respect, has already benefitted the investors who
have reaped dividends and capital gains over the years.14
c. the market's valuation of the electricity is reflected
In assessing whether a method of ratemaking or cost treatment is
confiscatory, one can consider the public's demand that it pay no
more than the services rendered to it are reasonably worth.'15 One
objective way to make such a determination in the electricity indus-
try is by allowing the market to set the price for electricity." 6 This,
however, would result in a denial of regulatory assistance in stranded
cost recovery because the market will set the price for electricity at
its marginal costs, which do not include stranded costs. 117
One can consider the economic market forces at work, as a util-
ity cannot demand that the consumer underwrite the costs of the op-
eration of economic forces." 8 Though Federal Power Commission
v. Hope Natural Gas1 9 indicates that it is just and reasonable to al-
low a financially sound company to maintain its financial integrity,
113. See id.; see generally St. Lawrence Gas Co., 42 N.Y.2d at 465 (empha-
sizing that a "utility is not guaranteed a profit and generally its investors run
the risk of losses in the same way as any other investor in a private business").
114. See David DeKok, Legislators Face Debate on Electric Competition,
PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), Nov. 24, 1996, at D1.
115. See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 308.
116. See id. at316n.10.
117. See Kahn, supra note 37, at 23-37; supra text accompanying note 41.
118. See generally Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548, 567
(1945) (stating that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution does not insure
values or require restoration of values that have been diminished by the opera-
tion of economic forces).
119. 320 U.S. 591 (1943).
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there is no obligation to do so in contravention of market forces.
120
Market Street Railway v. Railroad Commission 121 specifically distin-
guished Hope Natural Gas as inapplicable to "a company whose fi-
nancial integrity already is hopelessly undermined,.., and where in-
vestors recognize as lost a part of what they have put in."
122
Moreover, footnote 10 in Duquesne sanctioned the use of market
prices as an objective basis for determining utility asset values and,
hence, rates, thus sanctioning the concept that contravention of mar-
ket forces to give a utility positive returns is not necessary. 123 Disre-
garding utilities' other financial problems, which are independent of
the denial of stranded cost recovery, if the electricity generators were
competitors in a truly competitive market, they would be in ques-
tionable financial shape because they could not charge prices that
would allow them to recover the costs of their IPP contracts and un-
economic investments. In a truly competitive market, some com-
petitors would charge rates at their fixed and marginal costs or at
their marginal costs alone. 124 Therefore, if some generators tried to
charge higher prices to recover stranded costs, they would lose busi-
ness and go bankrupt. Their viable options would instead include
taking losses on the contracts, issuing debt to raise the capital to buy
out the contracts, decreasing dividends to cover write-offs each year
for uneconomic assets, and selling old assets. Market forces allow
no way for an electricity generator to recover all stranded costs
through charges to the customer, and there is therefore no legal re-
quirement that a Public Service Commission contravene these market
forces and allow the electricity generators to charge rates which will
allow evasion of the financial responsibility for their costs.
2. Case law restrictions on rate-making are not violated by denying
stranded cost recovery in a deregulated electricity industry
An electric utility would argue that Associated Gas Distribution
v. FERC,125 absolutely prohibits a government agency from refusing
to make provisions in a rate order to ease the financial burden on
120. See id. at 605.
121. 324 U.S. 548 (1945).
122. Id. at 566.
123. See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 316 n.10.
124. See Kahn, supra note 37, at 25-26.
125. 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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utilities of "uneconomical" contracts, similar to those the electricity
generators are currently under with the IPPs. However, Associated
Gas cannot legitimately be read to so hold. All the court in Associ-
ated Gas required of an agency setting rates in light of uneconomic
contracts in a deregulating industry was "reasoned decisionmak-
,,126mng.
In Associated Gas, the gas companies in a deregulating gas in-
dustry wanted regulatory assistance in dealing with uneconomic
"take-or-pay" contracts.' 2 7 These contracts are similar to the IPP
contracts under which former monopolists are currently bound.
While the D.C. Circuit took specific issue with many of FERC's rea-
sons for not providing relief from the take-or-pay gas contracts, they
made clear that they were not mandating that FERC reach any par-
ticular conclusions on remand. 128 Further, in American Gas Asso-
ciation v. FERC,129 the D.C. Circuit later affirmed FERC's adjusted
manner of dealing with the contracts130 indicating that there is some
leeway to refuse to free utilities from economic quandaries.1
3'
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing
Southeast v. United Distribution Companies,132 when holding that
FERC's decision to address the take-or-pay problem in a specific
proceeding was within its discretion, indicated that "an agency's rea-
soned determination" in the "complex area" of take-or-pay contracts
should not be second-guessed by the judiciary. 133 Thus, all that is
required to satisfy judicial review is "reasoned determination" or
"reasoned decisionmaking.', 134
126. Id. at 1023.
127. "Take-or-pay" contracts are requirements contracts which stipulate that
gas not purchased or "taken" must still, to some extent, be paid for. Thus, if
cheaper gas is available from alternative sources, the buyer can purchase gas
from the alternative source, but must still pay for gas that was contracted for,
but not purchased, under the "take-or-pay" contracts. See id. at 995-96.
128. See id. at 1030.
129. 912 F.2d 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
130. Although the court allowed contract buy-outs, it refused to intervene
and modify the contracts, thus only partially relieving the gas producers of
their burden. See id. at 1505-09.
131. See id. at 1505-07.
132. 498 U.S. 211 (1991).
133. See id. at 231.
134. Id. at 230-3 1; see Associated Gas, 824 F.2d at 1023.
STRANDED COST RECOVERY
In keeping with Associated Gas's requirement of reasoned deci-
sionmaking, state Public Service Commissions can refuse to force
consumers to assist in the recovery of stranded costs tied to the IPP
requirements. This refusal is well-reasoned in light of the IPP con-
tracts.
There is no indication that the utility generators cannot deal with
the IPP contracts and related costs. Buyouts of the contracts are
certainly an option.135 Merging with the IPPs to solve the contract
problems or merging with another large, solvent utility to bolster fi-
nancial stability is feasible. 136 Renegotiation of the contract terms,
on the basis that the contracts will otherwise bankrupt those bound
by them, is possible as well. Sale of segments of the bound utility to
either alleviate part of the IPP problems or to raise capital is feasible.
It becomes painfully clear, then, that the denial of regulatory as-
sistance in stranded cost recovery is acceptable rate-making. 137 For
the aforementioned reasons, the decision to place the risk, and thus
the burden, of stranded cost recovery on investors is reasoned deci-
sionmaking, within the parameters of state regulation and otherwise
beyond the review of the judiciary.
IX. CONCLUSION
Putting the stranded cost responsibility on those who incurred
the costs, former monopolists, can and must be done. It is both legal
and economically justifiable. To do otherwise would force an eco-
nomically inefficient course of action that the law does not require.
In a competitive market, cost recovery is addressed by those
who generate the costs. To impose costs on anyone other than those
incurring the costs is to create a fiction that is unduly beneficial for
those incurring the costs and economically unjustifiable to those
135. See American Gas, 912 F.2d at 1508-09; Kriss, supra note 53 (discuss-
ing proposed legislation which will provide state guarantees to aid Niagara
Mohawk to improve its credit rating in order to borrow money to buy out the
IPP contracts); NIMO Offers To Buy Out 44 Contracts With Independent
Power Producers, supra note 53, at 1.
136. See James T. Mulder, Upstate Utilities May Get an Urge to Merge
When Two Downstate Companies Join Forces, Analysts See a Trend, POST-
STANDARD, Jan. 3, 1997, at C6; Agis Salpukas, U.S. Agency Moves to Ease
Utility Mergers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1996, at Dl.
137. Non-ratemaking, as it were.
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bearing the costs. Thus, it is worth considering that there never was
a regulatory compact; former monopolists had a nice ride for dec-
ades; their investors had a similarly nice ride in that they were
shielded from the risks inherent in their investment; but Adam
Smith's invisible hand of the free market cannot be continually
pushed away. 138 It is time to let the invisible hand bring the benefits
of competition to a truly deregulated electricity generation market.
138. See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell
et. al. eds., 1976) (1776).
